Strange maps indeed
Here's a curious site that was featured in the Freakonomics blog: strange maps. Check it out, it has all sorts of interesting ways of displaying geographical data and some fabulous 19th century maps.
Chan S. Park, Gunter P. Sharp-Bette: Advanced Engineering Economics
Paco Underhill: Call of the Mall: The Geography of Shopping by the Author of Why We Buy
Bill Hare: Celebration of Fools: An Inside Look at the Rise and Fall of JCPenney
Griffin: Customer Winback: How to Recapture Lost Customers--And Keep Them Loyal
Marcia Layton Turner: Kmart's Ten Deadly Sins: How Incompetence Tainted an American Icon
James D. Lenskold: Marketing ROI : The Path to Campaign, Customer, and Corporate Profitability
Chris Zook: Profit From the Core : Growth Strategy in an Era of Turbulence
Nicholas Difonzo: Rumor Psychology: Social And Organizational Approaches
Marty Neumeier: The Brand Gap: Revised Edition (2nd Edition)
Chris Anderson: The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More
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Here's a curious site that was featured in the Freakonomics blog: strange maps. Check it out, it has all sorts of interesting ways of displaying geographical data and some fabulous 19th century maps.
My two previous posts about LTV were more descriptive than prescriptive, let us take a look into how LTV can be used as a tool to drive Marketing Strategy at a high level.
Some notes:
Looking at the plot of the previous post, we recognize that there are two areas under the bell curve: the one to the left of the y-axis that represents the probability of a customer being un-profitable and the one to the right that represents the likelihood of being profitable. Marketing Strategies strive to bring as much of the curve as possible into the positive domain (i.e. reduce the likelihood of having unprofitable customers), this can be accomplished by targeting the three customer LTV groups:
This list is not meant to be exhaustive but to give you an idea of how different tactics can be used to address the need to decrease the risk of customer unprofitability.
One observation about LTV that I commonly find is that it cannot (or is difficult) to come up with an LTV metric that is "useful" at the corporate level. This may be true for cases in which LTV is calculated as a deterministic average across all customers, in this post I'll suggest an LTV metric at the corporate level that is related to VaR (Value at Risk) and that is a good representation of the effectiveness of sales and marketing in a company.
The easiest way to understand what this metric is about is to outline how it is calculated:
Yes!!! That simple! You'll obtain a curve that will look like one of the following:
For the sake of simplicity, let's isolate the Normal curve and note that some customer LTVs are negative, these correspond to the unprofitable customers. The shaded area in the following diagram corresponds to the probability that a customer will be unprofitable, this is in essence a primary measure of "customer lifetime value at risk".
Given that some industries have a high likelihood that some customers will always be unprofitable, the threshold for customer value at risk can be set to the left of the y-axis at some other probability that is meaningful for that industry.
I trust that this metric of customer lifetime value at risk can become a useful metric for marketing and sales profitability. This metric represents the health of the customer pool of any firm.
Following my previous post on dropping unprofitable customers and some posts on blogs that I follow (Kevin) (David) (Jim) (Ron), it's time I touch on customer lifetime value.
Getting past the definition that customer lifetime models measure the present value of future cash flows that are expected from customers, here are some characteristics of a workable model:
Then, divide your customers into three groups:
Once you've built your model you will be able to better design your acquisition and retention efforts. In a nutshell, you want to:
All in all, targeting will always follow a targeting process that is oriented towards identifying profitable customers prior to designing strategies or tactics, for instance, if these customers are highly responsive to DM in-home one week after airing a TV30 spot, do not send them a catalog (unless this proposition has been tested and proved positive), also, if you're developing a responder model, use a data set that is composed of profitable customers rather than just "customers".
The recent misadventures of Richard "Quiet Lion" Brodie, one of the fathers of Microsoft Word, with Harrah's Caesars Palace property in Vegas remind us of why it is important to manage the customer pool and cull unprofitable customers.
According to Brodie's description, he went through a spell of good luck at the poker machines, Harrah's analytical systems flagged him as a non-profitable customer and he was subsequently sent a registered letter informing him that he had become persona-non-grata at Harrah's properties.
Although there must be some pain associated with receiving a letter such as that, the reality is that Harrah's did what most businesses should do: drop unprofitable customers. In fact, Harrah's followed a sensible process in that it took over a year to track Brodie's behavior and arrive at a conclusion. Being in the business that it is in, Harrah's might not have another course of action in avoiding non-profitable customers than sending them a letter, informing them that they are not to come back. It's harsh but that may actually be the only option.
The lessons for other industries is simple:
I'd like to side with Brodie, after all his post comes across as the writing of someone that feels victimized, but I have to agree with Harrah's in that profit is their raison d'etre and that they cannot cater to unprofitable customers.
Target Corp. has just pulled the plug on an online survey that asked questions that were getting a bit too personal. Good as their intent may have been, the questions seemed to personal for most people and a closer reading of the few questions indicated in the article doesn't shed much light into the possible use of this line of questioning.
Attitudinal surveys and models tend to be way too opaque for most marketers but Target's questions seem to defy interpretation... what would be the use of a segmentation that has a factor the depth of a customers' neurosis?
Would this be the beginning of a trend? The folks at Webster Pacific LLC have started a data aggregation site in Swivel's vein: Data360. They're stated aim for this site (still in beta):
Data360 has been created with two purposes: First, we hope that Data360 will help provide clear context to important cultural, environmental, social and economic issues. Second, Data360 is a tool for any organization to report on their internal performance with slideshow graphs for key business metrics.
The site does not have the same community building flavor of Swivel but does a great job of aggregating data and allowing users to access it. Navigation is also easy.
All in all it's a great site to help you nurture your inner geek.
Like it or now, use it more or less, LinkedIn has made itself into another useful business tool. As I started to blog and network, the number of my connections in the network started to increase significantly, my use of the tool also became more aggressive and after a change in the rules of use, my account was locked.
Regardless of whether I made frequent use of the account, it was an irritant not to be able to use the account as I previously had... and the fact that I use a free account did not diminish my sense of frustration. But this is where great customer service came in: LinkedIn took a bit to respond to my inquiries but the reps' enthusiasm and ability to resolve my issue was quite admirable, more so given that I use a free account!
I can't speak for other people's experiences but to me LinkedIn has displayed a remarkable sense of customer service even considering that I am not a profitable customer... here's a lesson to learn.
Oh, and, should you wonder, I am not paid to endorse LinkedIn.
Here's a quick case: would you rather take delinquent customers to court or sell their debt to a collection agency?
Certainly there is no clear cut answer as that would have to do with the amount owed, the margins involved and so on, but this hypothetical problem can shed some light into the decision process around collections.
In general terms, is it preferable for a retailer with a significant number of delinquent accounts and to take them to court to collect, or sell them for pennies on the dollar to a collection agency? In the first case, there is a significant cost associated with prosecuting every delinquency as well as a risk of losing the case or of taking too long to collect in case of a win as well as the possibility that only a fraction of the debt will be recovered. That is, the decision to prosecute entails a high level of risk and if there is a significant number of delinquencies on the sheet of receivables, there may be more risk on attaining quarterly targets than what's desirable.
On the other hand, selling the collection rights to an outside firm for a fraction of the actual debt, eliminates the risk from the process.
In any case, good targeting, sales and customer care should avoid a significant level of risk in collections.
An article in the Sacramento Bee about a stubborn PC owner that decided to bring Gateway to small claims court illustrates several good points about bad customer service, bad approach to business and to PR. A customer that received a defective computer, couldn't get it fixed, says he didn't receive a replacement machine and decided to take Gateway to small claims court instead of arbitration. Gateway now scrambles to bury the customer in legal costs and complications... all typical legal maneuvering and bad management.
This is a great example of how bad customer service tends to snowball into a costly problem: had Gateway reps or managers had had the power or the foresight to replace the computer, had been savvy enough to ship the new machine with receipt/signature confirmation, the problem would have been contained. Instead, the primary economies of the problem are all wrong now: imagine that the machine cost $1,000, and there are two options: send a new machine or follow the course that Gateway has chosen. In the first case, Gateway would have been out $1,800 ($2,000 minus the corresponding margin - say 20%), in the second case, assume 5, 45 minute calls at about $50 a call which comes to $250... eliminate the margin on the machine. Then throw in 5 hours of legal work at $300 an hour... by the time Gateway "wins" the case, it will be deeply in the red on this sale.
Add to this the erosion that the brand suffers from a case like this and you get a sense for how bad this whole idea of pursuing the case really was.
And on another vein... what's with this arbitration craze? Sure it is cheaper to put a case through arbitration than through the courts but I am not sure I see how that benefits a firm!? From a Machiavellian perspective it seems that the costs of a court case would deter most customer complaints, from a customer perspective it seems that arbitration is akin to resorting to a parallel legal system that is skewed towards the companies (even if it isn't, remember, image and perception are also areas that need to be managed), there is a fear of class action suits but, please, are most products really so bad that they warrant this fear?
All in all we go back to some basic parameters: superior products backed up by superior customer service go a long way to protect against risk; also, customers support managers must be equipped with the knowledge and power to know when to yield to a customer complaint.